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 THE  FTAA, THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 
 
  
 
The wrongly named Third Summit of the Americas held in Quebec from April 21-22, 
2001, with the attendance of President George W. Bush and the leaders of 33 Latin 
American and Caribbean countries has served to reaffirm the project of a Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA), launched by Presidents Johnson in 1967, and continued by 
George Herbert Walker Bush (father of the current president) in 1989. However, project 
negotiations only began during the Clinton administration, starting with the so called first 
Summit of the Americas, held in Miami in December 1994.  
 
Unlike previous projects, the FTAA stems from the U.S. offer to the democratic 
countries of the western hemisphere (Cuba is not included) to attain greater access to the 
North American market in exchange for accepting the regulations and political and 
technical conditions that are already currently in force in the context of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA: the USA, Canada and Mexico). The FTAA 
can be considered a second generation integration scheme, not limited to the mere 
elimination of customs tariffs, but extended to questions regarding democracy and good 
government, liberalization of economic reforms, competition, the opening of foreign 
sectors, and adoption of common technical regulations.  
 
In a certain sense it can be said that the FTAA is more like the common market 
driven by the Single European Act (obviously without any design of a Common External 
Tariff) than  the initial schemes of the European Economic Community of the 1957 
Treaty of Rome or of the European Free Trade Association resulting from the 1960 
Stockholm Treaty. They have spent forty years, not in vain, to know today, that the non-
tariff obstacles, more than the tariffs themselves, are the ones that prevent trade.  
 
The New Zealander, Mike Moore, General Director of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), analyzed the results of the Quebec Summit of the Americas noting 
that the FTAA and the future enlargement of the European Union (EU) renew the threat 
of dividing the world into commercial blocks regardless of the dialogue relating to open 
regionalism and its compatibility with the rules of the WTO.
1 The former President of 
Portugal, Mario Soares, stressed that the FTAA can move Europe farther away from the 
developing Americas.
2 
 
The FTAA worries Europe not only because trade between the 800 million people 
of the western hemisphere may be conducted without tariffs when the so-called customs 
disarmament takes place which is proposed to be begin by 2005, but also because of the 
impact this might have on technical and health regulations and the ways in which 
commercial and financial procedures are implemented based on United States rules and 
regulations, which will complicate the activities of European companies in the Latin 
American and Caribbean markets. In the future, this could change the terms of what until 
  1 
                                                           
1 Mike Moore, “WTO Warning on Trade Blocs,” Financial Times, 24 April 2001. 
2 Mario Soares, “Latinoamérica y la pasiva Europa,” La Vanguardia, 4 April 2001. now had been the concurrence between Europe and America on obtaining new economic 
trump cards in the countries of the South, affecting the Europeans that have more 
relations with Latin America and the Caribbean.  
 
The Europe Rivalry/The USA in View of the Countries of the South 
  
In the globalized world of the post Cold War period and when it was only forty years ago 
that the colonies disappeared, an important part of North-South relations is determined by 
the competition between the initiatives launched from Washington and Brussels. Since 
Africa is an area with greater European influence, Latin America and the Pacific are both 
areas in which this competition and rivalry can better be appreciated even though, 
throughout the world, the United States and Europe are always condemned to understand 
each other.
3 
  
In the area of the Pacific, the first Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
Summit, organized by the North Americans in Seattle in 1993, put forward the North 
American idea that the coastal countries of the Pacific will achieve free trade by 2003. It 
is true that the Asian crisis after the devaluation of the Thailand’s baht on July 2, 1997, 
the economic problems of Japan, and the problems of China to attain membership in the 
World Trade Organization - only  resolved in November 2001- have put this goal 
somewhat into question. In spite of everything, however, the reiteration of these 
intentions during later APEC Summits demonstrates that the process continues and has 
indeed widened with the inclusion of Mexico and Chile in the transpacific process, 
cooperation spanning from the Bering Strait to the Magellan Strait.  
 
The EU did not want to be left behind in improving its relations with the Asia-
Pacific countries and launched an initiative to develop closer relations with the area with 
the Europe-Asia Summit in Bangkok (March 1996).  In the Community case, relations 
with some Pacific Islands had previously been addressed on a higher level as a result of 
the existence of some French and British territories in the Pacific and also due to the 
implementation of the Lomé Convention.  Since 1975, these agreements established 
special ties between former British, Dutch and French Territories of the area and the EU.  
 
In the Latin America things are put forward differently because of the Monroe 
Doctrine of "America for the Americans."  Although some Latin American countries are 
playing the European card to offset U.S. influence, Brussels has always played a much 
smaller role than that of Washington. By the end of the nineteenth century, the United 
States had already established the Commercial Office for Latin America, the embryo of 
the future Organization of American States in which all the countries of the hemisphere 
participate except the Cuba of Fidel Castro which was expelled in 1962.  
 
In the western hemisphere, aside from more recent and rather rhetorical Spanish 
presence - now transformed into an important investment presence, the Lomé 
Agreements that Europe has with the countries of the Caribbean, and its special relations 
                                                           
3 Francesc Granell. “Conflicto y cooperación entre Europa y Estados Unidos,” Política Exterior, No. 60, 
November-December 1997. 
  2 with the French, Dutch and British provinces and territories of the area, Europe had and 
still has less intense relations in the area than the United States.  This is the case despite 
the meetings that have been held with the Group of San Jose since 1985, with the Rio 
Group since 1990, and with the Andean Group since 1996, and in spite of the support that 
Spain and Portugal have tried to stimulate with their Ibero-American Summits since 
1991, and the support that the European Community lends to the Latin American and 
Caribbean processes of integration with special dedication to the now suffering 
MERCOSUR.  
 
The culmination of this European wish to counter the weight of the United States 
on the sub-continent took the format of the first Europe-Latin America-Caribbean 
Summit (Rio De Janeiro, June 1999) between the leaders of the 15 members of the EU, 
fifteen countries of the CARIFORUM associated with the EU through the Lomé 
Agreements, seven Central American countries, ten South American countries, and Cuba. 
This process, however, is still far from the process that the North Americans have with 
Latin America for the simple reason that the European ambitions cannot be compared to 
the relation with the lands south of the Rio Grande and the waters to the south of Florida
4. 
  
U.S. relations with Latin America have gone through several stages – some sweet, 
some bitter, such as those in which the ideals of the Castro government planted the seeds 
for a “war” between U.S. multinationals and the Latin American progressives. The 
importance of trade and tourism investments, however, have been of such a magnitude 
that the disputes have always been solved except in the case of the attempted invasion of 
the Bay of Pigs in Cuba which took place over forty years ago
5.  
 
 
The North American Invitation to the FTAA 
 
It is in this context that one must place the North American project to invite the rest of the 
countries of the hemisphere to participate in a free trade area from the Arctic to the 
Antarctic. This idea was first launched by George Bush, Sr. in 1989, and later made more 
concrete by Bill Clinton at the Summit of the Americas held in Miami in December 1994, 
to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) capable of extending to the rest of 
the continent the agreements that the United States has in force with Canada and Mexico 
through the NAFTA.  
 
The FTAA process has not stemmed, then, from the Summit of the Americas held 
in Quebec from April 21-22, 2001, regardless of the importance the republican Bush 
administration has placed on continuing the process, and Congress approving the free 
trade authority that was previously (as fast track) denied to Clinton. The process can 
seem, furthermore, not very innovate since Latin America has had a series of sub-
regional integration processes in place for years in the hopes of lessening the limitations 
that have always existed because of the smaller and more closed markets of Latin 
                                                           
4 Francesc Granell, “La primera cumbre Europa-Latinoamérica-Caribe,” Boletin Información Comercial 
Española, No. 2621, 21 June 1999. 
5 Joaquín Roy, “Cinco años de ley Helms Burton,” Cinco Días, 13 March 2001. 
  3 America and the Caribbean, and because the Americas and the Caribbean have been and 
still are home to ambitious transnational projects.  
 
The more nostalgic of these projects goes back to the memory of Simón Bolívar 
when Panamericanism began at the Congress of Panama (1826).  One can also recall the 
creation of the Inter-American Bank of Development as a result of the Panama Summit 
(July 1956) in which Dwight D. Eisenhower along with sixteen other presidents of the 
western hemisphere advanced this project and established the basis on which John F. 
Kennedy could launch the Alliance for Progress.  
 
Without going too far ahead, at the Punta Del Este Summit (April 1967), the U.S. 
President Johnson and nineteen Latin American leaders agreed upon the creation of a 
Latin American Common Market by 1980, a project that was soon forgotten and remains 
a part of the past.  
 
The FTAA process that began in Miami in 1994 and is now underway, is much 
stronger than it appears considering the current ideologically anti-protectionist era.  It is 
important to recall that the WTO - since its beginning in January 1995 - has stimulated 
free trade on a global level (perhaps even more than I would have guessed) and both the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have imposed policies on 
openness in the foreign sectors for the countries in need of their financial support.
6  
 
With respect to the way of doing things, the revolution seems clear to me. The 
FTAA is not yet an invitation to a negotiation in which each and every one of the parts 
strives to obtain what is better for it according to its current situation. The FTAA is, 
simply, an invitation from the United States to the rest of the countries of the hemisphere 
to become part of the free trade area that first began with Canada, and later with Mexico. 
This invitation contains a forceful philosophy: in today’s globalized world the countries 
that want to develop must accept the opening of their borders to trade and multinationals. 
In other words, those who do not want to  embark on the hemispheric tram launched by 
Washington as the dominant economy, runs the risk of being excluded from the 
international division of labor which must be recognized by the states that want to attract 
technology, trade, and international investments. Canada and Mexico understood NAFTA 
as such at the time and are growing as a result of this free trade agreement, even though 
many consider that this growth has caused clear social costs and a greater dependency on 
the United States.  
 
The President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, in the Summit of the Americas of 
Quebec, did not accept 2005 as the year to begin this process. Nobody has worried too 
much about this position. The U.S. seems to be telling  the populist Venezuelan leader: 
"if you do not want to join the FTAA in 2005, you will quickly begin to realize what it 
means to remain outside the process in which we are inviting you to participate". 
                                                           
6 Francesc Granell, “La OMC y la fallida cumbre de Seattle,” Política Exterior, No. 70, January-February 
2000. 
  4  
The Summit in Quebec and the FTAA Process 
 
 
Amidst the disturbances that the "globalphobes" create about whenever there is an 
international meeting in which the ideas of the “single thought” are promoted (Seattle, 
Prague, Davos, Buenos Aires, Florence, Gothenburg, Barcelona, Genoa...), the third 
Summit of the Americas held in the Canadian city of Quebec has not generated great 
progress in giving an additional push to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
project.  It does constitute another step in the process of technical and political meetings 
which were initiated with the idea of inaugurating the project by 2005
7. It has also served 
to demonstrate that Bush intends to be more active in this area than was its predecessor 
now that the Congress has grants him the necessary fast track authority to negotiate the 
FTAA and to undertake the new multilateral Round within the WTO launched in the 
Doha fourth Ministerial Meeting on November 14, 2001.  
 
After the hemispheric meeting of Quebec, there remain three important mysteries:  
 
a) How is the process of creating a large free trade area in the western hemisphere going 
to be made compatible with the regional economic groups and the bilateral agreements 
that already exist in the Americas? 
 
b) How is the large power negotiator of the Southern Cone, MERCOSUR, going to be 
able to maintain a common position (as Brazil wants) if Argentina has had to force a 
repeal of the Common Foreign Tariff because of the magnitude of its financial crisis? 
and; 
  
c) In the context of the new multilateral Round of the World Trade Organization, how 
will the criticized North American agricultural protectionism characterized by domestic 
subsidies on exports and hundreds of tariffs on agricultural products be changed in 
accordance with new global standards?  
 
The Quebec Declaration and the Action Plan approved by the 34 presidents or 
heads of government (remember that the Queen of England continues to be the Head of 
State of Canada as well as numerous Caribbean countries) provides for the reaffirmation 
of the fight against drugs and terrorism, and the necessity for democracy and good 
government. This requirement permits continuing to leave the Cuba of Fidel Castro out of 
the continental dialogue. During the week of the Summit of the Americas of Quebec, 
Cuba celebrated the fortieth anniversary of the unsuccessful anti-Castro invasion of the 
Bay of Pigs, and received a visit from Kevin Costner, actor of the film that recreated the 
missile crisis between Kennedy and Kruschev that put the world on the brink of a nuclear 
confrontation. In Quebec the Latin American and Caribbean countries demonstrated that 
they understand the game that has been offered to them by Washington with complete 
recognition that the U.S. market is very important to them. There is a sound skepticism 
                                                           
7 See various texts from Tripartite Committee of the Inter-American Development Bank-Organization of 
American States-Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean, www.ftaa-alca.org. 
  5 on the part of those who know that this project is only going to partially contribute to 
helping solve the problems of the sub-continent that continue to reappear in the 
international forums in which they take part: the fight against poverty and the 
marginalization of indigenous populations which is now a top priority in the post-PRI 
Mexico of Vicente Fox. The Latin American leaders are also conscious of the fact that if 
they want their countries to become more modernized, it is preferable to be the tail of a 
lion than the head of a mouse.  
 
Now that the Latin American countries have been developing democracies, and it 
is fashionable to refer to the Spanish case of the late 1970s as paradigmatic, I am sure that 
many Latin American countries think that present day Spain also serves as an example on 
the economic level. Excluded from Europe and with protectionist policies there was not 
much that this country could do. Riding in the European car, it is advancing. In this sense, 
the FTAA process is a kind of insurance to become attached to the continental 
locomotive in exchange for accepting the determined rules of the game from Washington 
with all of the agreements that it implies. The FTAA process does not only progress 
during continental summits (Miami 1994, Santiago 1998, Quebec 2001, and the next 
Summit which will be held in Argentina) but also in the technical meetings resulting from 
a proposal made by Clinton in January 1994. These meetings are meant to address the 
following five subjects: democracy, trade, integration, development and growth, and 
prosperity. From that point on, a tripartite committee headed by the Inter-American Bank 
of Development, the Organization of American States, and the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean have stimulated this process and, since 1995, an 
Analysis Group of the implementation of the process (established in 1995 with the USA, 
Canada and Chile) has been monitoring the advancement of this process.  
 
The Trade Ministers of the FTAA countries have been meeting. Their sixth meeting, 
in fact, took place in April 2000, in Buenos Aires, in the middle of large "globalphobic 
protests", and they have been ratifying and stimulating the activities of the negotiation 
groups referring to the following commercial questions:  
 
-  access to markets: tariffs, regulations and technical barriers  
-     investments and their protection 
  -     services 
  -   public sector spending 
 -    agriculture 
  -   dispute resolution 
  -   copyright laws 
  -   subsidies, antidumping and compensatory rights 
 -    competition  policy 
 
There are special groups referring to three transverse subjects:  
 
-   private companies 
  -   smaller economies 
  -   electronic trade 
  6 The Declaration of the Ministerial Meeting of Toronto (November 1999) established a 
mandate with  measures to facilitate hemisphere-wide business for the following sub-
groups:  
 
-   measures related to customs matters that would facilitate business 
  -   implementation and requirements of technical assistance 
  -   hemispheric guide of customs procedures 
  -   hemispheric databases 
  -   visa requirements for business trips 
  -   rules on foreign investment and investment agreements 
  -   arbitration and other dispute resolution procedures  
  -   technical necessities for the small economies 
-        education and training related to trade 
 
Thanks to the entire process which began with the Ministerial Meeting of Denver (June 
1995), and continued in the subsequent annual ministerial meetings (Cartagena 1996, 
Belo Horizonte 1997, San Jose 1998, Toronto 1999, and Buenos Aires 2000) and in the 
meetings of experts, the FTAA process is strong, and is not only affirmed in the political 
will that may show itself in the Declarations and Action Programs approved in the 
Presidential Summits, but also in the silent work of thousands of civil servants of the 34 
hemispheric countries involved in this process.
8 
 
 
The FTAA Among the WTO and the Regional Systems of the Americas 
  
One of the questions currently on the table is the compatibility between the FTAA on a 
global level and the different existing integration schemes in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  
 
The Secretariat of the Latin American Association of Integration (ALADI) has 
put this matter forward as one that technically presents a larger problem since Latin 
America and the Caribbean have in force a series of integration schemes and multilateral 
and bilateral agreements.
9  Furthermore, and as if the aforementioned was not sufficient, 
all these attempts at integration must comply with the rules on regional integration as 
established by the WTO. To tell the truth, the FTAA is the extension of the NAFTA to 
the rest of the continent using the model that began with the free trade agreement 
between Canada and the USA and that, since January 1, 1994, includes Mexico. 
 
However, the circumstances have changed over the past few years. First, the free 
trade impetus that Clinton was able to launch when he obtained the acceptance from 
Congress for the results of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1994, and when he was able to launch his APEC Summit initiative, and 
the FTAA, has been blurred to a certain extent by the success of the open multilateral free 
trade system and the initiation of the WTO on January 1, 1995.  
                                                           
8 OEA-BID-CEPAL-OPS-BM Office, “De Santiago a Quebec,” Washington, DC 2001. 
9 ALADI, “Definición de una estrategia para la preservación de las preferencias Aladi en el acuerdo que 
establecería el ALCA,” Montevideo, 2001  
  7 Before the creation of the WTO, global integration was opposed to regional 
integration systems and fought to make them mutually compatible. The current stage is 
characterized by a generalization of the concept of open regionalism in which belonging 
to a regional union does not imply being closed to third countries out of the regional trade 
area. The Single European Market (December 1992/January 1993) aroused fears of a 
Fortress Europe with strong internal ties but less anxious to open to third countries. 
 
If before internal tariffs were reduced and external tariffs remained high, 
nowadays both are reduced in a measured way in the context of structural reforms 
directed at making economies more open.
10 For this reason, after the tariff reductions 
associated with the agreements of the Uruguay Round and, above all, as a result of the 
liberal policies of the foreign sectors launched by the majority of the Latin American 
countries, prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank , the 
interest of the FTAA is no longer concentrated on the removal of still existing tariffs, but 
in what it can be achieved regarding the reduction of agricultural protectionism that the 
Americans continue to practice and that the Latin Americans do not stop criticizing. They 
Latin American countries -together with other members of the Cairns Group- have 
submitted multiple complaints regarding the agricultural policies of Japan, the USA, and 
the EU.  They have also taken objection to other non-tariff barriers that prevent access to 
markets, calling for easier capital mobilization on a regional level, and the creation of 
precise conditions so that the countries of the western hemisphere may be suitably linked 
to the globalization led, mostly, by the multinationals of the United States and, 
marginally, those of Europe and Japan.  If the success of the WTO reduces the interest in 
a system of regional integration that does not go beyond pure tariff protectionism, 
bilateral and sub-regional agreements in the Americas have been recovering a certain 
pulse in these times  (except for the special problems of MERCOSUR) and thus, no 
country seems favorable toward abandoning its respective sub-regional area of 
cooperation which have been negotiated over the last forty years.  
 
Everybody is wondering how the current bilateral agreements and the sub-
regional schemes are going to be integrated into the global scheme stimulated first by the 
United States, and then by the United States and the Organization of American States 
(OAS), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), since these institutions joined the North 
American government as the  initial promoter of the project. It is true that one of the 
principal sub-regional schemes,  MERCOSUR, is not experiencing its best moment for 
many reasons which I will address further on below, but it does not become any less true 
that the economic diplomacy of Latin America and the Caribbean is sufficiently 
embedded that nobody dares to do without what they have so arduously negotiated over 
the last forty years.  
 
The ALADI Secretariat has questioned the idea of becoming the FTAA-plus, 
taking advantage of its advanced degree of integration, achieving FTAA style integration 
in some sub-sectors of Latin America.  This matter is far from resolved because the 
                                                           
10 Robert Devlin and Antoni Estevadeordal, “What’s New in the New Regionalism in the Americas?” 
INTAL ITD-STA, Working Paper No. 6, May 2001. 
  8 different systems of integration in Latin America with their particular structures, needs, 
and goals, have little in common with the FTAA. 
 
As is commonly known, in the fifties and sixties, a series of regional economic 
integration was being created on all continents.  In America, history played an important 
role in the creation of the Central American Common Market, the Managua Treaty of 
December 13, 1960, and in the Caribbean Free Trade Association created by the 
Bridgetown Treaty of April 27, 1968, shortly after the dissolution of the Western India 
Federation in existence  from 1958 to 1962. In the case of the South American countries 
and Mexico that formed the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), and after 
the first industrialization stage based on import substitution on the national level, the only 
way to overcome the stagnation caused  by the small closed local markets was to expand 
the field for industrialization based on import substitution to the regional level.   
 
This was the great impetus for the creation of the LAFTA (Montevideo Treaty,   
February 18, 1960). This wave of integration had its ups and downs, and after the initial 
enthusiasms the schemes ran into many problems. The open negotiation project, without 
any closed lists, and with strict timetables, became a potential for conflicts in the LAFTA 
that, recognizing the impossibility of closing the stipulated Common List, entered a stage 
in which it was unable to meet its obligations.  All of the LAFTA members decided on 
the transformation of this regional organization into a much more flexible ALADI 
(Montevideo Treaty, August 12, 1980). Five Andean countries, on their own, created a 
much more ambitious sub-regional system with clearly defined obligations of sub-
regional integration, becoming a reality with the signing of the Cartagena Agreement on 
May 26, 1969.  The Andean Group would later encounter a series of problems caused by 
the incorporation of Venezuela, and the withdrawal of Chile immediately after the change 
of its economic policy toward commercial opening and the attraction of foreign 
investments introduced by the dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet.  
 
After the first big wave of integration, a second was produced in the 1990s that 
provided for the creation of the NAFTA on August 11, 1993, and the revival of certain 
Latin American schemes due to new open economic policies accepted by the majority of 
the countries dealing with the problem of external debt, and when the reestablishment of 
democracy in the hemisphere permitted progress in integration that had been unthinkable 
in the context of the national focus dominant during the military dictatorships.  
 
The Trujillo Protocol of March 1996 transformed the Andean integration into the 
Andean Community of Nations and the Andean Integration System, trying to recover 
wasted time and the problems that the group has been dragging along since the middle of 
the seventies, despite beginning in force and with clear institutional parallels to the 
European process of integration.  The Andean Integration System has tried to overcome 
the problems of the Alberto Fujimori’s auto-coup in Peru (April 1992) and the return to 
the intergovernmentalist nature by aspiring to create a free trade area by July 31, 2005.  
The presidential mandate establishes commitments that lead to the Andean Common 
Market that should come into operation, at the very latest, on December 31, 2005, with 
commercial implications and the free movement of production agents. 
  9  
 The old Central American Common Market with serious management problems 
in the past, especially after the war between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969, was 
transformed into the Central American Integration System with the pacts of 1992-1993. 
In 1996, the five countries of the area decided to implement a new, more open tariff 
policy with regulations to facilitate internal trade.  In this area, however, there is a strong 
duality of duties between the Secretariat for the Central American Economic Integration 
that manages the General Central American Integration Treaty with headquarters in 
Guatemala, and the Central American Integration System that stems from the political 
process of Esquipulas in 1986.  
 
During this last wave, Caricom has shown significant progress.  Its small member 
states have demonstrated a new tradition of good governance and the European Union 
has supported their attempts at regional integration through the successive Lomé 
Agreements. 
 
At the beginning of 1995, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela started the Group of 
Three. This free trade process was characterized by the particular political situation in 
Colombia, by the progressively weakening Venezuelan economy since the beginning of 
the seventies - despite the rise in the price of oil , and the Mexican preoccupation with 
joining the NAFTA and  negotiating a free trade agreement with the EU, both of which 
have been accomplished.  
 
Above all the aforementioned Latin American processes of integration, the most 
important of the new generation is Mercosur, born from the projects of cooperation 
between Argentina and Brazil, shaped in the Iguazu Act of November 1985, a few 
months after the Argentine president, Raul Alfonsin, implemented the Austral Plan to 
stabilize the  country’s economy.  The Treaty of Asunción (March 1991), the Leñas 
timetable (June 1992), and the decisions of the Ouro Preto Summit (December 1994) 
converted Mercosur into a partial customs union on January 1, 1995, and into true hope 
for a system capable of spreading confidence to other Latin American countries.  At the 
same time, channels of cooperation with Europe were opened through an initial 
framework agreement for cooperation signed during the European Council of Madrid in 
December 1995. 
 
The first tensions within Mercosur began when trying to agree upon the common 
external tariff in order to launch the partial customs union by January 1, 1995.  However, 
the political attraction of Mercosur to other Latin American countries became evident 
with the signing of the future free trade agreement “4 + 1” between Chile and Mercosur 
on June 25, 2001.  The technical conflicts over “sensitive” products require continuous 
negotiations. 
 
The full integration of Chile into Mercosur is impossible, as was indicated by the 
IDB at the time because, among other reasons, of the differences between the common 
external tariff of Mercosur and the Chilean tariff of a single rate and much lower level. 
Bolivia, despite its commercial negotiation process with Mercosur, cannot hope to 
  10  become a full member since Bolivia is part of the Andean Group, a clear violation of the 
Treaty of Asunción.  
 
The ascendance to Mercosur’s success began to fall with the devaluation of the 
Brazilian real  at the beginning of 1999, allowing for increased export capacity towards 
its three integration partners.  As a result of this devaluation, Argentina has been 
experiencing a state of crisis, culminating in the crash of  2001, forcing the government 
in Buenos Aires to suspend the implementation of its common external tariff.  This 
setback threatens the aspirations of the Brazilian president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
of Mercosur negotiating as a single unit with the United States in the FTAA process.  
 
As if these multilateral agreements were not enough, there are also a great number 
of bilateral agreements of many types throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Cases like the Mercosur agreements with Chile and Bolivia; of the Caricom with the 
Dominican Republic; of Chile with Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, Peru and Ecuador; of 
Mexico with Uruguay and Bolivia define future bilateral or bilateral-multilateral free 
trade areas, while others such as Ecuador with Uruguay and Paraguay; of Mexico with 
Argentina and Paraguay; of Brazil with the Andean Community; of the Andean 
Community with Mercosur; of Mexico with Brazil, Peru and Ecuador, and of Chile with 
Bolivia are representative of different levels of preferential trade agreements but not quite 
reaching a level of free trade.  
 
This complex puzzle of integration systems
11 and agreements defines the reality 
of a hemisphere convinced that the autarkic way is not possible, but that also puts 
forward problems of adjusting the existing regional pacts to the FTAA process.  
 
 
Accumulated experiences  
 
With this backdrop the FTAA project means another step towards continental free trade, 
extending the internal advantages of the NAFTA and those in the U.S.-Caribbean Trade 
Partnership Act and the Caribbean Basin Initiative,
12 and doing everything in conjunction 
with the rules of the WTO.  The problem is how the processes of bilateral customs 
disarmament already under way today will be articulated if the FTAA prevails by 
December 2005, and in accordance with what has been stipulated, begins a process of 
tariff disarmament that would last a certain number of years depending on the strength of 
each one of the economies included in this project.  
 
What has been said up until this point serves to demonstrate that the FTAA needs 
to learn the lessons from some of the integration failures in Latin America.  The FTAA 
process should recognize the necessity for common policies and acceptable agreements; 
that there is a clear articulation between national laws and the rules of integration; that 
the private sector must be fully associated with the process which must be clear to 
                                                           
11 See the situation of the integration in the Americas in  IDB: Integration and Trade in the Americas, 
Periodic Note, Washington 
12 R.Leon and J.M. Salazar Xirinachs: The New Caribbean Basin Initiative: Impact and Opportunities,  
INTEGRATION AND TRADE, vol. 5. Num 13, January-April 2001 
  11  everybody; to have a clear regulatory system in which approving legislation for the 
integration system is not allowed to remain in permanent debate since this can cause 
stipulated deadlines to be missed and ambitions of integration to become diluted; that the 
regional processes must try to stimulate democracy so that their benefits are not lost due 
to corrupt or disloyal practices. In addition to these lessons the FTAA model will have to 
incorporate other issues that have not been tackled and that could negatively impact the 
process to be approved in 2005.  
 
In this sense there are many academic fields that recall that liberalization 
guarantees an increase in the volume of trade but not the fair distribution of the 
advantages of the globalization.  Today it is clear that such a guarantee can only come 
from the existence of common institutions and the creation of corrective financial 
mechanisms. The FTAA model follows the line of open regionalism compatible with the 
rules of the WTO and the wish to establish a large Latin American area in which the 
obstacles to internal transactions disappear, but also follows the line of trusting that the 
flows of international private investment takes care of the function of financial re-
equilibrium among countries, which in the sixties was relegated to official development 
aid.  
 
The experience of the last few years in reducing that aid shows that this aspiration 
is utopian. While aid can be directed towards the fight against poverty, international 
investment is intended for places that can offer better prospects of profitability and, later, 
the circulation of development to the indirectly affected populations can be inoperative if 
there are no policies that make it possible.  
 
For this reason, the ambitions of the FTAA process to make the globalization  
work in the Americas correspond to the wishes and needs of the country with the 
dominant economy and strong capacity to persuade others to accept its rules of the game, 
but it does not convince those who believe in democracy, good government and so many 
other positive elements that the FTAA stimulates, but consider that the free trade area on 
its own will not resolve the situation of the underdeveloped countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. 
 
With poverty growing in some Central and South America countries, if the United 
States really wants to attack problems at their root, an analysis of the best instruments for 
achieving the planned results is totally necessary.  
 
   
 
  12  